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The Challenge of Authenticity.  





When she died of cancer in June 2006, English pianist Joyce Hatto was hailed 
as a musical genius by the press. In the previous thirty years, despite illness, 
she had proven capable of mastering an incredible repertoire, encompassing 
nearly the entire literature ever composed for piano. Prodigy of old age, she 
was thought to deserve a place of honour in the annals of classical music. 
Which, indeed, she obtained – as a plagiarist, though. Hatto’s fake record-
ings, all stolen from other interpreters, have given rise to one of the greatest 
scandals in music history.  
But why do we oppose plagiarism in the first place? More than being just a 
matter of cultural or sentimental values, in this paper I argue that our rejection 
of plagiarism has to do with the idea of art itself as a special form of human 
accomplishment. Unrevealed forgery and plagiarism trigger our admiration 
through a form of deception: they disguise the accomplishment. Given the 
advances in the field of audio-visual material digital alteration, there might, 
however, be increasing confusion in the future over what counts as a fake. Is 
technology reshaping our view of musical authenticity? 
 
Keywords: Aesthetic Appreciation, Authenticity, Plagiarism, Digital tech-
nologies. 
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Abstract 
Quando morì di cancro, nel giugno 2006, la pianista inglese Joyce Hatto fu 
salutata dalla stampa come un genio della musica. Nei trent’anni precedenti, 
nonostante la malattia, si era dimostrata capace di padroneggiare un repertorio 
incredibile, tale da includere quasi tutta la letteratura esistente per pianoforte. 
Prodigio della terza età, Hatto sembrava meritare un posto d’onore negli an-
nali della musica classica. E lo ottenne, in effetti – ma come plagiatrice. Le 
registrazioni di Hatto, tutte false e rubate ad altri interpreti, hanno dato origine 
a uno dei più grandi scandali della storia della musica. 
Ma perché rifiutiamo il plagio? In questo articolo sostengo che il nostro rifiuto 
del plagio, lungi dall’essere solo una questione di valori culturali o sentimen-
tali, ha a che fare con la nozione stessa di arte come una speciale forma di 
realizzazione umana. Falsificazione e plagio, quando non vengono rivelati, 
suscitano infatti la nostra ammirazione attraverso una forma di inganno: essi 
mascherano il risultato finale. Dati i progressi nel campo dell’alterazione di-
gitale del materiale audiovisivo, tuttavia, in futuro potrebbe verificarsi una 
crescente confusione riguardo a ciò che consideriamo falso. Può la tecnologia 
indurci a rivedere la nostra visione dell’autenticità musicale? 
 






This paper raises a number of issues that lie at the core of aesthetics as it is 
commonly understood and practiced in current analytic philosophy. As we 
shall see momentarily, these issues are as fundamental to the discipline as 
they are broad-ranging from a theoretical viewpoint. My aim here won’t be 
to offer a solution to any of them, however, for this – provided it is possible 
at all – would require a much more thorough investigation than a single paper 
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allows. Rather, I intend to open up some space for rethinking how we under-
stand and articulate these problems, particularly in view of the challenges that 
come to us by the increasingly massive use of digital technology in the con-
temporary production of art and music. 
The first of these problems calls into question a crucial issue for aestheti-
cians, i.e., how aesthetic appreciation works and what it means to aestheti-
cally appreciate a work of art. In the context of art and music reception, what 
is this ‘appreciation’ about, and in what sense is it ‘aesthetic’?1 The second 
problem articulates the previous one: when it comes to appreciating an artistic 
product, how important is knowing about the object’s origins and its produc-
tion process? For example, to what extent awareness that a certain musical 
piece was composed by a child rather than an adult influences our evaluation 
of it? The third problem is more specific and revolves directly around the 
impact that digital technologies and the web may exert on our ability to for-
mulate aesthetic judgments. Given its current spread and accessibility, how is 
technology going to change the way we enjoy, appreciate and evaluate the 
arts and music?  
Complex as they are, these three related problems will constitute the red 
thread of this paper. They will take us down a path running from the meaning 
of plagiarism and the value of authenticity in the aesthetic frame up to the 
notion of ‘performance’ and how it affects our perception of the arts and mu-
sic especially. Instead of tackling our investigation directly, though, I suggest 
that we go about it in a roundabout way, so to say. Let us start with a story – 




1 To make this question even more complicated, consider also that it is far less than obvious 
that aesthetic appreciation works in the same manner for all works in different art forms. 
There may in fact be substantial differences how we relate to different types of art – painting, 
music, literature – so that each of them may require separate consideration (for this approach, 
see especially: Kivy, 1997).  
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2. The Greatest Pianist No One Has Ever Heard Of 
This story starts when a life story ends. It was the 26th of June, 2006. In her 
cottage near Cambridge, England, the 77-year-old English pianist Joyce 
Hatto2 was about to breathe the last of her breaths under the caring gaze of 
her husband, William Barrington-Coupe, a former classical-music agent and 
a recording engineer. In the previous twenty years, despite being seriously ill 
with cancer, Hatto had experienced moments of great popularity as a musi-
cian. With her husband acting as producer, and despite having retired from 
concertizing decades earlier, she had been able to record an amazing number 
of CDs – in fact, more than 1103 – for a record label called Concert Artist, 
created by her spouse to provide «a board for British talent sadly neglected 
by the major record companies»4. The list of Hatto’s recordings comprised an 
amazing musical repertoire, which covered virtually the entire standard liter-
ature for keyboard: Bach, Beethoven, Brahms, Chopin, Schubert, Liszt, a lot 
of Rachmaninoff and Scarlatti, Mendelssohn, Mozart, Mussorgsky, Saint-
Saëns, Schumann, Tchaikovsky, Godowsky and so forth.  
Interestingly, Hatto’s fame in the early 2000s grew directly proportional 
to the development of the first discussion groups online – virtual platforms 
like the Yahoo group ‘ThePiano’ and other Usenet/Google newsgroups, 
where participants, mostly aficionados and music connoisseurs, engaged in 
 
 
2 Online literature on the Hatto case is immense. In this paper, I rely in particular on two 
articles written by the journalist Mark Singer (2007a; 2007b) for the NewYorker. A very 
accurate documentary on Hatto’s biography is also available at the following link: < 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cG5MxQTOThk>. The story is also commented in Dut-
ton (2009). 
3 By way of comparison, just consider that Arthur Rubinstein, one of the most productive 
pianists of the twentieth century, recorded only 90 discs throughout his whole career as a 
performer. 
4 Quoted in Singer (2007a). 
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erudite and often heated discussions over the value of particular performances 
or recordings.  
In fact, Hatto had already become a ‘viral phenomenon’ in online forums 
even before she finally experienced her exploit in the world of serious music 
critique. This happened shortly before her death, when the chief music critic 
of The Boston Globe, Richard Dyer, interviewed her and wrote that, to his 
mind, she was: «the greatest living pianist that no one has ever heard of», «a 
hidden jewel» (Dyer, 2005) with amazing capabilities as a performer. Dyer 
had listened to about a third of Hatto CDs and found that all of them were 
excellent. Indeed, the woman seemed able to do Schubert in one style, and 
then Prokofiev almost as she were a new person playing a different piano.  
Hatto also combined her incredible musical talent with a peculiar form of 
wisdom. «Nothing belongs to us; all we do is pass it along» she claimed dur-
ing one interview «As interpreters, we are not important; we are just vehicles. 
Our job is to communicate»5.  Well, this was an appropriate motto! It soon 
became clear that “being a vehicle” and “pass it along” was exactly what 
Hatto was up to.  
Let us jump ahead a few months. It was winter 2007, circa six months after 
Hatto’s death, when someone called Brian Ventura, a financial analyst from 
Mount Vernon (NY), received a package he had been waiting for for a long 
time. An avocational pianist and a music lover, Ventura had ordered online 
one of Hatto CDs, a performance of Liszt’s “Transcendental Études” he had 
read about in the Yahoo’s music group he was a member of. He unwrapped 
the disc and put it into his computer’s disk drive and then, through the Apple’s 
iTunes software, he connected it to Gracenote, one of the first Internet data-
base of recordings able to identify songs by analyzing the duration of the 
trace, an ancestor of modern applications like Sound Hound or Shazam. Sud-
denly the Gracenote database revealed the unexpected: the disc was correctly 
 
 
5 Available at the following link:  <http://www.denisdutton.com/hatto_rnz_interview.mp3>. 
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recognized as a performance of Liszt’s Études, but one by the Hungarian pi-
anist László Simon! László Simon? How could this be possible? – Ventura 
wondered – perhaps the database was mistaken? 
It could be, of course, but in the very same days, a similar disconcerting 
result was obtained by a group of scholars working at the Centre for the His-
tory and Analysis of Recorded Music of the University of London. The team, 
guided by the famous musicologist Nicholas Cook, had been immersed for 
some time in a comparative study of recordings of Chopin mazurkas through 
a software capable of tracing patterns of similarity between different perfor-
mances. When the group of researchers entered two tracks from Hatto Ma-
zurkas in the database, the system revealed that this time her version was 
identical to a previous one by Eugen Indjic, a Serbian soloist!  
It’s easy to guess how this story ends. Within a few weeks after the initial 
discovery, digital analysis identified most of the original sources of Hatto 
CDs – she hadn’t played one single note of all this impressive number of 
recordings: most of them had been stolen from little known performers, and 
then slightly altered in time and speed by Hatto’s husband via the use of ad-
vanced sound processing programs. Ironically, thus, if digital technology al-
lowed Hatto’s early success, it also caused her final misfortune.  
 
3. Plagiarism, Forgery and Other Artistic (Mis)adventures 
Falsification, treachery, deception: there is enough in Hatto’s story to feed the 
greedy imagination of the media across the globe and fuel one of the greatest 
scandals in music history. The pianist was guilty of a particular form of «ar-
tistic crime» (Dutton, 1979): she was a plagiarist. Along with the cheated mu-
sicians, her audience was her innocent victim. Of course, the Hatto affair is 
hardly one of a kind in the history of the arts. As most domains in human 
enterprise, the art world is pervaded by greed and ambition, and attempts at 
frauds have always flourished. For example, there is evidence that already in 
ancient Rome, sculptures made by craftsmen of the day were passed off as 
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classical Greek antiques and sold at high prices to naïve aristocrats. Cicero, 
Livy and Pliny all show concern about this phenomenon of false signatures 
appearing on old statues6. There is, however, a substantial difference between 
these types of frauds and that perpetrated by Hatto. In the first case (that of 
old Roman statues) we usually talk about forgery or counterfeiting. In Hatto’s 
case, on the other hand, we talk about plagiarism. Both forgery and plagia-
rism can be defined in terms of an artwork presented to an audience with the 
explicit intention to deceive. Fraudulent intentions are indeed necessary to 
distinguish forgeries and plagiarism from honest copies, quotations, explicit 
homages, or pastiches (i.e., works created “in the style of”). Forgery and pla-
giarism, however, must also be distinguished from one another. For example, 
were Hatto to produce a pianistic forgery, she would have had to record 
Liszt’s “Transcendental Études” herself and sell this performance to the mar-
ket as a retrieved recording by, for instance, Ferruccio Busoni. But Hatto was 
instead a plagiarist: she stole other pianists’ work and presented it as her own 
with only a few alterations. We can sketch this distinction in the following 
way. 
Forgery involves the misattribution of a name to a work. One steals some-
one else’s name to add value to one own’s work. What is in question in for-
gery is thus the attribution of authorship7. 
Plagiarism, on the other hand, involves taking another person’s work or 
ideas and making them pass as one’s own, to add value to one own’s name 
(in order to make some profit out of it). A common case of plagiarism is an 
instance where someone publishes a text which was originally written by 
someone else. In plagiarism, thus, content is in question. This is why, com-
pared to forgery, determining the boundaries of plagiarism is much more 
 
 
6 See especially Pliny’s comments on this in the book XXXL of his Naturalis Historia (Pliny, 
2018). For a discussion on forgery in ancient Rome, see: Casement (2016). 
7 For a comprehensive account on forgery, see: Wreen (2002). 
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problematic. For example, to which point is the borrowing to count as a rob-
bery? What can count as an independent invention and what cannot? How 
different should two works be from each other to be considered independent 
artistic products?   
Luckily for philosophers, it is usually the courts that have to deal with these 
thorny issues, deciding whether or not, in every single case, there has been an 
infringement of copyright laws. Clearly, however, Hatto’s case is not partic-
ularly ambiguous from a legal point of view. The Barrington-Coupe deliber-
ately committed a form of fraud that deserved as such to be condemned in 
courts: this point is rather uncontroversial8. What is interesting about this 
story are not its legal aspects, nor the scandal it provoked on international 
tabloids9, but the fact that it has important conceptual implications for many 
open questions in the field of aesthetics – especially in the light of the three 
issues we mentioned at the beginning of this paper.  
One major problem arises when one considers the reactions of critics and 
experts to Hatto’s recording production. How come, one can wonder, the 
same music critics who had given negative reviews of some original record-
ings wrote enthusiastic reviews of the very same recordings plagiarized and 
released by Hatto?  Singer (2007a) reports a striking example of this. In 1992, 
a critic from the illustrious magazine The Gramophone wrote that pianist 
Yefim Bronfman’s interpretation of Rachmaninoff Third Concerto lacked the 
 
 
8 Curiously, though, no legal actions were taken against Mr. Barrington-Coupe after the dis-
covery of the fraud. As a matter of fact, the British authorities stated that no legal action 
would have been taken if the copyright owners of the original recordings had not previously 
filed a complaint; which, however, did not happen (Beckford, 2007). See: <https://www.tel-
egraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1543977/Yes-I-did-pass-off-piano-CDs-as-wifes-work-says-
widower.html>. 
9 In 2012, the popularity achieved by the case led the BBC to produce a television movie 
based on Joyce Hatto's story “Loving Miss Hatto”, with a screenplay by Victoria Wood and 
Katie Meluai. The movie is available at: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b01pm5m5>. 
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required «angst or urgency» and that «he sounds oddly unmoved by Rachma-
ninov’s intensely Slavonic idiom». Fifteen years later, commenting on the 
very same recording released by Hatto, he claimed that it was: «stunning, truly 
great, among the finest on record, with a special sense of its Slavic melan-
choly».  
Arguably, part of the enthusiasm among music critics and listeners was 
due to a sort of wonder or astonishment that Hatto could be so tirelessly pro-
ductive during what should have been her retirement years. People, both ex-
perts and amateurs, were thrilled by the idea of this old lady playing the piano 
like a young virtuoso, an undertaking made even more impressive by the fact 
that she was fighting a battle with cancer. This kind of considerations, with 
the bunch of sentimental imagery they invoked, probably played a major role 
when it came to judging the aesthetic value of “Hatto” performances. In this 
sense, it is not surprising that collective enthusiasm turned to blame and re-
proach as soon as the fraud was discovered. 
This brings us to an important issue from a philosophical viewpoint. In-
deed, if the reaction of critics and the general audience was surely understand-
able, one can question whether it was also justified. In other words, is it right 
that we allow moral, psychological, sentimental, contextual or generally ex-
tra-aesthetic considerations to influence our aesthetic judgments so much? 
Why do we let plagiarism and forgery compromise our aesthetic apprecia-
tion? And finally, is this attitude really so natural, essential, and necessary, 
or should we rather do our best to prevent it, if possible?  
 
4. Authorship, Authenticity, and Aesthetic Appreciation 
Interestingly, this kind of (normative) questions have been at the core of in-
terest for philosophers of art ever since the emergence of modern aesthetic 
theory. A case somewhat comparable to Hatto’s is mentioned in the famous 
paragraph 42 of the second book of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, where a 
naughty boy deceives the participants in a country party by perfectly imitating 
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«the bewitchingly beautiful note» of a nightingale «with a reed or a pipe in 
his mouth».  Just like Hatto’s audience, as soon as the party guests discover 
that the sounds they liked so much actually came from the boy and not the 
bird, all their interest suddenly disappears: «the instant one realises that it is 
all a fraud no one will long endure listening to this song that before was re-
garded as so attractive» (Kant, 2000: 182)10. 
In more recent times, these questions have given rise to one of the most 
long-standing discussions in the field of aesthetics, that revolving around the 
notion of authentic artwork and its ‘perfect copy’ or fake (Goodman, 1976; 
Sagoff, 1978; 2014; Danto, 1981; Dutton, 1983; Elgin, 1991; Bowden, 1999; 
Wreen, 2002; Kulka, 2005, among the others). The central question in the 
debate is just: what difference does authenticity make from an aesthetic point 
of view? If a fake is perfectly identical to the original, or if it satisfies us 
aesthetically, why worry about who created it and how? As expected, the de-
bate is split between those who insist on the role of authenticity in the context 
of aesthetic appreciation and those who deny it.  
A classic argument in defence of the aesthetic value of authenticity can be 
found in Nelson Goodman (1968). In the famous Chapter III of his Languages 
of Art, Goodman contends that authenticity plays a central role in aesthetic 
appreciation11. For Goodman, a difference in authorship between two art-
works, an original and a copy, which may be currently imperceptible, can 
later become an aesthetic difference (Goodman, 1976: 99-102). As a matter 
of fact, just because today we may not be able to distinguish between the two 
works, it does not follow that we will always be unable to perceive a differ-
ence between them (Goodman, 1976: 105).  
 
 
10 It is important to stress that Kant does not use this example to discuss the issue of authen-
ticity, but rather to add to his discussion of natural beauty. 
11 See: Goodman, 1976: 99-122. Goodman is commonly regarded as the initiator of the de-
bate about authenticity in the analytic scene. 
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To clarify Goodman’s argument, we can consider one of the most famous 
forgeries in art history, van Meegeren’s work Christ and the Disciples at Em-
maus, from 1937. The painting was considered for more than one decade an 
authentic work by Veermer, until van Meegeren himself finally admitted he 
had forged the painting to save himself from the charge of connivance with 
the Nazis, to whom he had sold the work during the war12. Here is for instance 
what the famous Vermeer scholar Abraham Bredius wrote about it: «Neither 
the beautiful signature ‘I.V.Meer’ […] nor the pointillé on the bread which 
Christ is blessing, is necessary to convince us that we have here a – I am 
inclined to say – the masterpiece of Johannes Vermeer of Delft […] In no 
other picture by the great master of Delft do we find such sentiment, such a 
powerful understanding of the Bible story – a sentiment so nobly human ex-
pressed through the medium of the highest art» (Bredius, 1937: 210-211). 
Looking at this painting today, with the awareness that it is a fake, it seems 
almost incredible that people could have considered it an authentic baroque 
picture. It clearly displays elements of the style of his own time. As Dutton 
(2003: 330) notices, for example, the characters’ faces seem influenced by 
the photographic images of the Thirties (like Greta Garbo’s). The man in pro-
file, in particular, shows facial features that today, in retrospect, appear mod-
ern. These stylistic aspects were much less obvious to the viewer of the 1930s, 
probably because they appeared simply ‘normal’ at the time. This, however, 
confirms Goodman’s intuition: perceivable differences between an original 
and a fake may emerge and, later on, appear obvious. Knowing that an art-
work is forged, we change the way we look at it: we try to detect subtle qual-
ities that distinguish it from the original, and in this way, we learn to see such 
differences (Goodman, 1976: 111-112). In this sense, for Goodman as well 
as for the many writers who have followed his lead, forgeries and originals 
are perceptually different. 
 
 
12 For details about the story of this painting and its discovery as a forgery, see: Frank (2006). 
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Another famous justification for authenticity in the context of art appreci-
ation comes from Arthur Danto (1964; 1981). Danto agrees with Goodman 
that there is an important aesthetic difference between an authentic artwork 
and its perfect fake or copy, but unlike Goodman, he does not think that this 
depends on the fact that we might be able in the future to perceive such dif-
ference which is unnoticeable at present. According to Danto, what distin-
guishes an original from a forgery is what he calls an «atmosphere that is 
theory» (Danto, 1964: 580-581); art theory – in other words, all the ideas and 
meanings that an artwork expresses – are what makes an artwork what it is. 
Of course, it is something imperceptible (precisely because it is an atmos-
phere), nor can artworks wear it «on their surfaces» (Danto, 1981: 44), but it 
still plays an essential role. Since a completely different theory surrounds an 
original work and its forgery, it is impossible for them to have the same value, 
even if they are to remain forever perceptually indistinguishable. 
Danto’s examples to support his claim are well-known13. In one of them, 
drawing on the classic metaphysical problem of indiscernible Danto asks us 
to imagine a gallery in which a number of monochromatic red paintings, all 
identical in size and colour, are hung. The first is a painting called “The Isra-
elites crossing the Red Sea”; the second is entitled “Kierkegaard’s Mood”, 
while another one represents the “Red Square”. All these paintings are mate-
rially identical to each other so that they are impossible to distinguish at a 
mere glance (Danto, 1981: 44). There are, however, important aesthetic dif-
ferences between these works, which start to emerge once one comes to know 
their title, their subject, the intent of their authors, that is, once one becomes 
 
 
13 Another relevant scenario proposed by Danto (1981) includes the case of three identical 
red ties painted by Picasso, a forger and a child. According to Danto, the ties painted by the 
child and the forger cannot have the same inherent meaning as that produced by Picasso 
himself. Each of these three objects is invested with a different atmosphere that cannot be 
physically determined.  
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part of the theoretical atmosphere that surrounds them. This example, accord-
ing to Danto, shows that perceptible properties alone cannot define something 
as an artwork. The context, ideology, and atmosphere in which an artwork is 
created determine indeed its meaning and value (Danto, 1981: 101). It follows 
that authenticity is for Danto less what one sees and more what one knows.  
 
5. Aesthetic Empiricism and the Cultural Value of Authentic-
ity 
Although most scholars have taken either Goodman or Danto’s side in the 
attempt to defend the aesthetic value of authenticity, these are not the only 
available positions on the table. According to authors like Clive Bell (1949), 
Alfred Lessing (1965), Eddie Zemach (1986) and, more recently, Peter Ja-
worski (2013) we should answer negatively to the question as to whether our 
aesthetic appreciation should be affected by non-aesthetic, moral, historical 
considerations. When it comes to aesthetic judgments, what is valuable 
should be detected merely by looking at the object, or by hearing it: we must 
not allow ourselves to be influenced by anything else. The argument goes as 
follows:  
P1) what we admire as aesthetically valuable in a work of art are its aes-
thetic properties; 
P2) aesthetic properties, whatever else is true of them, are perceptible – 
they can be seen or listened to by grasping the surface features of the object; 
P3) knowledge that a work is plagiarized, that it was created by an old 
woman, a child, and even perhaps a machine, does not alter the perceptible 
qualities of a work; 
C)  hence, such knowledge shouldn’t make any aesthetic difference to us: 
this is only a piece of extrinsic information14.  
 
 
14 For a version of this argument see: Lamarque (2010: 133-134). 
De Musica, 2020 – XXIV (2) 
119 
Here is what Bell writes in this regard: «To appreciate a work of art we 
need to bring with us nothing but a sense of form and colour and a knowledge 
of three-dimensional space […] We need to bring with us nothing from life, 
no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no familiarity with its emotions […] To 
those who have and hold a sense of the significance of form what does it 
matter whether the forms that move them were created in Paris the day before 
yesterday or in Babylon fifty centuries ago?» (Bell, 1949: 37). 
This position has been famously termed «aesthetic empiricism» by Greg-
ory Currie (1980: Ch.2). Aesthetic empiricists like Bell claim that features 
that cannot be perceptually detected, such as contextual factors related to the 
work’s origins are not aesthetic, thus, they should ideally not bear upon aes-
thetic appreciation. If they do, it is just because we are fetishists (Zemach, 
1989: 66) sentimentalists (Jaworski, 2013: 403), or snobs (Lessing, 1965: 
461). But if we could learn how to separate aesthetic criteria from the other 
extrinsic norms that guide our judgments, we might even come to enjoy 
Hatto’s recordings just like those of ‘anyone else’ (which in a sense, they are).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, aesthetic empiricism, as a philosophical position, 
has found much more critics than supporters among contemporary aestheti-
cians (Lamarque, 2010: 122), for it seems to be clearly at odds with our stand-
ard way of experiencing the visual arts and music. We tend to attribute great 
importance to authenticity in the artistic frame – namely, to the fact of expe-
riencing originals as opposed to reproductions. People are willing to travel 
distances to view authentic art pieces, even if they wouldn’t be able to distin-
guish them from reproductions and even if reproductions could offer a more 
rewarding experience. This also explains the monetary worth of originals. A 
poster of Leonardo’s Mona Lisa, in the Louvre bookshop, may cost around 
15 euros, yet the actual painting is priceless.  
Contrary to what both Danto and Goodman seem to think, however, such 
considerations should not deceive us about the status of authenticity: the value 
we attach to it may be much less obvious than it seems. Our aesthetic re-
sponses are indeed greatly affected by our cultural values, and authenticity 
De Musica, 2020 – XXIV (2) 
120 
itself is but a legacy of the Western culture (Lowenthal, 1994; 1998).  In the 
Occident, we tend to care deeply, perhaps sometimes excessively, about who 
created a work of art and when. However, we know for certain that our de-
mand for authenticity in art, as well as our devotion to the cult of genius, are 
not universally shared15. For example, most countries in the Far-East interpret 
what is to be valued in a work of art in terms that are not reconcilable with 
ours (see Weiler and Gutschow, 2017). As Korean philosopher Byung-Chul 
Han explains, the Far-East «does not know the cult of the original […] One 
could also say that originals are preserved through copies» (Han, 2017: 67). 
As an evidence, Han refers to a number of misunderstandings that happened 
between China and Western museums. Often, the Chinese send copies abroad 
instead of originals, in the belief that they are not essentially different from 
the authentic artworks. The obvious rejection that then comes from the West-
ern museums is perceived by the Chinese as an insult (see Han, 2017: 64).  
An inter-cultural approach is therefore necessary to shed light on the com-
plex nature of aesthetic appreciation: philosophers who imagine that we can 
completely separate aesthetic criteria from other cultural norms fool them-
selves, for this is actually impossible. To use Leonard Meyers’s convincing 
phrasing, we can no more rid ourselves of these presuppositions of perception 
than we can breathe vacuum (Meyer, 1967: 57). But we can go even further 
on this: the point is not simply that external elements such as social expecta-
tions, cultural beliefs, sentimental values, or tastes impinge on our aesthetic 
appreciation. The point is, rather, that this may be exactly how aesthetic ap-
preciation works in the first place (Meyer, 1967: 58). 
 
 
15 To be honest, different traditions exist also in our culture. Consider for example the case 
of sacred Byzantine icons. These deeply symbolic images are only appreciable if we lay aside 
expectations of artistic originality. As Titus Burkhardt (2005) claims, the authenticity of the 
art of the icon, its intrinsic value, owes nothing to the subjective “originality” of its realiza-
tion. The success of the enterprise «is dependent above all on intuitive wisdom; as for origi-
nality, charm, freshness, they will come of their own accord» (Burckhardt, 2005: 160). 
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6. The Artwork as Product and as Performance 
To assess the different positions that have so far been presented, something 
more needs to be said about the concept of authenticity. Authenticity is a fa-
miliar notion in art theory, but it is also a sort of ‘umbrella term’ that it is 
quite difficult to pin down. Among the many possible meanings that the term 
takes on in aesthetics, however, a distinction tends to emerge around two main 
categories. Either the predicate ‘authentic’ is used in the sense of being ‘of 
undisputed origins’ or in the sense of being ‘innovative, original’. The first 
meaning refers to what is called “historical” or “nominal” authenticity (Kivy, 
1995; Dutton, 2003: 259) in the philosophical literature. A work is authentic 
in this sense if it is what it claims to be in terms of origins, author, provenance 
– as opposed to a forgery, an instance of plagiarism, or a fake. This seems to 
be the sort of authenticity with which Goodman, Danto as well as aesthetic 
empiricists are concerned.  
The second meaning of authenticity is more subtle and less related to ‘cut-
and-dried’ provenance facts. It is what Peter Kivy (1995: 108), in his discus-
sion of musical performance, refers to as «personal authenticity», while Denis 
Dutton (2003: 259) labels it «expressive authenticity». Regardless of the 
name used to describe it, authenticity in this second sense has mostly to do 
with creativity, meant as the property of an object being the product of an 
artist’s individual genius. This sort of authenticity comes into play when art 
objects are evaluated as vehicles for the artist’s self-exploration. Authenticity 
is meant therefore as «faithfulness to the performer’s own self, original, not 
derivative or aping of someone else’s way of playing» (Kivy, 1995). An art-
work or performance achieves expressive authenticity «by challenging pre-
vailing taste» (Gracyk, 2009: 156), by being innovative, or «by being true to 
one’s artistic self, rather than true to an historical tradition» (Dutton, 2003:  
267). While, as we have seen, the aesthetic import of nominal authenticity is 
a contentious matter involving a number of cultural, moral, and social biases, 
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the understanding of expressive authenticity as an aesthetic property seems 
relatively uncontroversial16. All things being equal, a work of art that is an 
original expression of an artist’s creative genius is more valuable to us than a 
derivative one: it opens up new perspectives, excites our imagination in new 
ways, or stimulates discussion among the audience17.  
Focusing on personal authenticity is useful because it allows us to better 
understand where our rejection of plagiarism and forgery comes from. Indeed, 
the point is not so much who created a work of art and when, but rather what 
these pieces of information tell us about the innovativeness of the work, un-
derstood as a creative endeavour carried out against a certain background of 
historical and cultural conventions. 
One intuition that seems fundamental in this regard is that our evaluation 
of art is not confined to considering artworks as ‘finished products’, but as 
resulting from particular productive processes (Sagoff, 1978: 463). In other 
words, the way art and music are produced and the type of procedures in-
volved determine our appreciation. To this extent, if an original is different 
from a forgery, it is because it is the result of a unique creative act, whereas 
the forgery is not. Dutton (1979; 1983; 2003; 2009), for example, has con-
tended that people assess all types of artworks – paintings, sculptures, sona-
tas, ballets, as well as renditions of pieces of music, literature, or theatre – as 
«the end-product of a human activity» (Dutton, 1979: 305). All art, and not 
 
 
16 Although there is room for some cultural relativism in this case too. For example, innova-
tion is not particularly valued in many South-Saharan African cultures. Young (2006: 470) 
reports the case of some religious sculptures produced by the Kalabari Tribe of southern 
Nigeria. Beyond their sacral purpose, these artefacts are all the more appreciated as they 
closely resemble previously existing sculptures.  
17 That works can be fully authentic in this second sense is questionable, for each work of art 
is at least partially derivative to the extent that it is indebted to an existing artistic tradition. 
This, however, does not remove the possibility that it be innovative, for tradition provides a 
background for the artist’s creative innovation.  
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only the so-called performing arts, incorporates at some level the notion of 
performance, whereby ‘performance’ refers to a human activity that involves 
a relevant accomplishment or achievement (Dutton, 1979: 304; see also Lev-
inson, 2004: 15).  
Of course, different artworks stand in differing relations to the perfor-
mances of artists, depending on the artform in question and how their objects 
are to be appreciated. On the one hand, we have arts such as (live) music, 
where the human activity required to create the object of our aesthetic appre-
ciation and the object itself are one and the same thing. To this extent, when 
we see a pianist at work, we are always conscious of his agency, since the 
performance involved (the act of playing) and the object of aesthetic contem-
plation (the music played) coincide. In such a case, to perceive the object is 
to perceive the performance. Less obvious is the element of performance in 
an art like painting, where we normally perceive the artwork without perceiv-
ing the actions that have brought it into being. So for instance we won’t im-
mediately think of the artist’s performance when contemplating a painting 
that has hung for centuries in a museum. Yet also in this case, according to 
Dutton, the object of our appreciation is perceived as the result of human ac-
tivity, a sort of ‘representative’ of human performance. The fact that arts dif-
fer with respect to whether we perceive the act of creation when it is actually 
performed, however, makes no difference to the relevance of the concept of 
performance. The concept of performance is indeed «internal to our whole 
notion of art» (Dutton, 1979: 305).  
Interestingly, recent studies in empirical psychology (Newman and 
Bloom, 2012; Newman, Bartels and Smith, 2014) have confirmed Dutton’s 
intuition, based on a number of experiments that changed the circumstances 
under which an artwork has come into being. Participants in the experiments 
assessed an artwork differently if it was done by someone in the 18th century 
versus someone in the 21st century, by a renowned artist versus an outsider, 
or by an adult versus a child, even though the two works were perceptually 
identical (Newman and Bloom, 2012: 559) This evidence corroborates the 
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idea that we appreciate works of art mostly as human achievements coming 
out of human skills and techniques. From this perspective, art is like any other 
performance activity, including sport (Newman and Bloom, 2012: 559): we 
care how the obtained results have been achieved; if they have come out from 
natural vs artificial skill for instance (see: Riis, Simmons and Goodwin, 
2008)18. Just like a successful sport performance, a successful artistic product 
represents a way of overcoming a number of technical and aesthetic obstacles, 
making do with available materials with the aim to produce an original artistic 
result. Although the final product may be designed for our appreciation as an 
object of contemplation in its own right, i.e., independently of the activity of 
the artist itself, this should not lead us to underestimate a fact that we take for 
granted:  that the work is the result of human agency, and must be evaluated 
as such.  
Further support to this position has come from recent work in neuro-aes-
thetics, investigating the role of the motor system in the observation of visual 
art. According to these researches, appreciation of visual artworks goes well 
beyond the ability of the brain to capture the observable features of the objects 
themselves. Since vision is a multimodal enterprise (Gallese and Di 
Dio, 2012), visible traces of the artist’s creative gestures (like brush strokes 
on a canvas) are interpreted by the brain as goal-directed movements, capable 
as such of activating the relevant motor areas in the observers’ brain (Freed-
berg and Gallese, 2007). Our appreciative involvement with art can thus be 
described as a form of ‘embodied simulation’: «a functional mechanism char-
acterized by the reuse of motor representations when observing the […] (vis-
ual) results of such actions» (Umiltà et al., 2012). This testifies to the idea 
 
 
18 This helps explain why doping typically provokes moral outrage. Why do we assume that 
doping is wrong? One main reason is that we believe that the aim of sport is to test the natural 
limits of human action. By artificially extending those limits, doping is at odds with the very 
essence of sport. Similar considerations apply in some sense to art as well. 
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that when in front of a work of art, we do not just behold the finished product, 
but also ‘see’ in our mind (or brain) the performative actions carried out by 
the artist in realizing it.  
Consider a piano performance, for example Rachmaninoff “Piano Con-
certo No. 3”, one of the most technically challenging piano concertos in the 
entire classical piano repertoire. In listening to a good rendition of “Rach 3”, 
we are listening not simply to an appealing ‘sonic surface’, but to how a hu-
man being has overcome various obstacles and technical limitations in devel-
oping the possibilities encoded in the score by the composer. In this sense, 
when it comes to evaluating this rendition, we may consider dynamics, phras-
ing, tempo, note, and rhythmic accuracy, among many other features. But be-
hind all these considerations lays the central presupposition that it is human’s 
bare hands that produce the sounds. To the same extent, our delight when 
hearing a virtuoso derives from an admiration for what the performance rep-
resents in terms of human accomplishment19. The way this accomplishment 
is obtained makes all the difference – which helps explain our sense of be-
trayal for Hatto’s story20.  
Interestingly, it seems that we also treat the composition of music as a per-
formance, an activity involving human agency. What is indeed Rachmaninoff 
“Piano Concerto No. 3”? It is of course an object of our aesthetic appreciation 
 
 
19 Not by chance, ‘to admire’ means ‘to enjoy’ but also brings with it implications of esteem 
(in this sense, one can admire a work of art also even without particularly enjoying it). 
20 This is partly explained by the fact that our aesthetic evaluation of music seems to be 
also influenced by cues coming from sensory channels other than the ears (Vuoskoski et al., 
2014). We tend to judge music differently if we listen to it and simultaneously see the musi-
cian playing. Recent experiments have confirmed that the role of visual information in the 
perception and experience of musical performances is just as important as auditory infor-
mation for the subjective aesthetic reactions of recipients. In particular, it seems that sight 
has considerable effects on the perception of auditory expressivity (see: Vuoskoski et al., 
2016). 
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as a beautiful piece of music, but it is surely more than this. As a product of 
human artistry, we admire how the composer has modulated its fascinating 
melodies; we notice how expressively and dramatically he has devised his 
piano writing, how convincingly he has handled the constant and almost un-
interrupted piano weave, marking its presence with respect to the orchestral 
texture; finally, we appreciate the transcendental virtuosity of the musical 
structure with regard to the prevailing late-romantic conventions at Rachma-
ninoff’s time.  
“Rach 3” constitutes thus an appealing sonic experience, whose aural 
beauties are unquestionable, but it is also a profound human achievement. 
Neither of these elements can be favoured to the detriment of the other: both 
are part of our assessment of it as a great work of art. Of course, we could still 
distinguish between the piece as an object of aesthetic appreciation from the 
circumstances of its production. Such distinction is possible in theory, but the 
point is that we never completely split up these elements in the actual process 
of appreciation. In this sense, our experience of music can never be under-
stood as an experience of pure sounds, so that the faster and more brilliant the 
sounds are, the better. Our experience implies the experience of a human 
achievement, of something done in a certain way by a certain human being 
against the background of the technical and conventional obstacles and limi-
tations within which he/she had to work. This constitutes the main expecta-
tion we have when it comes to appreciate a piece of music. 
 
7. Future Challenges 
What has been observed so far should provide the reader with a rather faithful 
image of the way art appreciation, broadly understood, works for us. To be 
sure, however, things do not necessarily have to be in this way. We can well 
imagine different manners of evaluating musical performances, and even the 
assessment of what counts as valuable or meaningful in music performance 
can change from the way it is right now. This brings us to the third and last 
question mentioned at the beginning, concerning the role of technology in the 
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definition of criteria for aesthetic appreciation. New technological conditions 
may alter what counts as inventiveness, audacity, eloquence, banality, wit, in 
a work of art and music, changing what we are willing to consider artistically 
successful.  
Consider again the Hatto scandal. On the one hand, the fraud committed 
by the pianist would have never been possible in a different age, one lacking 
the technological tools needed to allow the digital manipulation of stolen mu-
sical recordings, the alteration of sound speed, etc. On the other hand, in the 
absence of these, it would not even have been discovered.  
In the next decades, techniques allowing the alteration of audio-material 
might experience a boom. Synthetically produced musical renditions, im-
proving a singer’s pitch or increasing a pianist’s speed, may come to be con-
sidered perfectly normal in the musical practice, just as we accept today that 
musical pieces are recorded on separate sessions on various days21.  
Take for instance the contemporary spread of an audio-processor like 
Auto-Tune, a digital pitch-editing plugin developed in the late 1990s to al-
ter pitch in vocal and instrumental music both in recording and in live perfor-
mances, and used especially within the pop, hip-hop, and R&B musical gen-
res. The processor is intended to disguise or correct off-key inaccuracies by 
slightly shifting pitches to the nearest true, correct semitone. Although the 
electronic modification of music has existed for years in many forms (effects 
pedals, modular synthesis, etc.), very few technologies in the past have had 
such cultural impact as auto-tune on the production and reception of music 
(Diaz, 2009). After its first use in 1998 in the song ‘Believe’ by the pop-singer 
 
 
21 Interestingly, the 2020 Covid-19 outbreak has rendered remote recording the usual work-
ing procedure for musicians. While currently due to the impossibility for musicians to get 
together because of the preventive anti-epidemic measures, this modus operandi may take 
hold in tomorrow’s musical practice, so that in the next future we may increasingly see virtual 
choirs, remote orchestras and distance concerts even in so-called ‘live’ music. I thank the 
reviewers of this paper for suggesting this idea.  
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Cher, where the software was employed to produce a ‘robot-like voice’, Auto-
Tune has indeed become standard equipment in professional recording stu-
dios, while also being frequently used in live concerts, as a kind of ‘safety 
net’ to guarantee a successful performance. Today, many in the musical world 
– singers especially – contest the overuse of the processor by reproaching its 
negative effects on society’s perception and consumption of music (Proven-
zano, 2018; 2019). Some listeners also disdain Auto-Tune from a belief that 
this technology «erodes authenticity» by making skilful singing irrelevant 
(Provenzano, 2018: 162; 2019: 77). Notwithstanding the criticisms, Auto-
tune’s popularity is constantly being renewed on the internet through the cre-
ativity of millions of users. Along with its technology being easy to access, 
Auto-tune is an appealing tool in its simplification of complex music theory 
and performance, giving the user the instant gratification of a professional 
sound without the time and effort that comes with voice training and practice. 
Part of Auto-Tune’s success is based on the common-sense assumption that 
perfect pitch tuning increases the value of a musical piece, contributing to its 
overall aesthetic appreciation. As questionable as this idea may be22, thanks 
to its spread on the web, usage of Auto-tune within the contemporary music 
scene seems hard to disappear anytime soon. In fact, along with other similar 
tools, Auto-tune may become an integral part of tomorrow’s musical practice 
(and appreciation).  
Another way in which the spread of digital technologies may affect our 
understanding of how we appreciate and evaluate music has to do with the 
massive recourse to appropriation in contemporary music production. In aes-
thetics, appropriation describes the process by which an individual repurposes 
and ‘makes his/her own’ some pre-existing artistic material in the process of 
 
 
22 As a matter of fact, it can be argued that some deliberate (or even spontaneous) vocal de-
tuning adds to the aesthetic outcome of a performance, giving character, personality and a 
more original temperament to the piece, especially in musical genres such as jazz or blues. 
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art creation, either by taking it from another individual or a different culture 
(Young, 2006; 2008). Appropriated artistic material can include both com-
plete works and artistic «elements» – musical themes, ideas, motifs, insights 
– that constitute «the building blocks of works of art» (Young, 2008: 4). Far 
from being a contemporary phenomenon, appropriation has flourished 
throughout the entire history of music. Just like contemporary hip-hop com-
posers, who sample and resample other people’s music to produce new tracks, 
musicians have always been borrowing and reusing existing passages or ex-
cerpts from other musicians to create their own original pieces. Händel, for 
instance, is famous for having extensively stolen from other composers what-
ever material suited his purpose (Hatch, 1985; Buelow, 1987).  
What is interesting about new digital media (smartphone application, the 
internet) however, is that they are increasingly providing an interface through 
which even the ‘person-on-the-street’ is allowed to create their own music by 
appropriating, sampling, mashing up and then sharing it across a wide net-
work (Dillon, 2006: 292). Material sampling and appropriation permeate to-
day nearly every aspect of music production and creation. Consider for ex-
ample the great number of musical networks that allow players to inde-
pendently share and shape each other’s’ music in real-time, facilitating not 
only synchronous, virtual communication but also in some cases face-to-face 
interaction (Weinberg, 2005; Dillon, 2006). Among other things, these plat-
forms enable wider forms of collaboration and partnership between different 
musicians than ever before. 
As a result, while potentially leading to a radical transformation of the mu-
sic profession, the spread of appropriation practices within new digital media 
may also affect our view of musical creativity. Traditional approaches 
(Dewey, 1910; Rossman, 1931; Guilford, 1959) interpret creativity according 
to what can be called the “genius in the tower” model, which overemphasises 
the role of the individual person at the expense of understanding how the con-
text, place and social interaction influence artistic production. In this model, 
the possibility of appropriating someone else’s ideas and ‘making them one’s 
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own’ is considered only as a peripheral if not an entirely detrimental aspect 
of the central phenomenon of individual artistic creativity. New forms of mu-
sical expression promoted by digital technologies, however, may lead us to a 
different consideration of appropriation, one in which borrowing someone 
else’s music is no longer seen as an ‘artistic crime’, but rather as a strategy 
for further creative achievements. In this perspective, rather than being 
equated to a thief, the appropriator becomes someone who «takes from one 
pot to feed another and in doing so creates new opportunities» (Dillon, 2006: 
302). This can cause increasing confusion in the future over what counts as 
plagiarism, fake, forgery in music production and performance and eventually 
require our entire view of both historical and personal authenticity to be re-
casted, to a point where reference to innovation, originality, human achieve-
ments, etc. may become superfluous.  
On the one hand, these processes can have considerable consequences 
upon current copyright laws, which might have to be diluted or even amended 
under the pressure exerted by the new cultural and artistic values permeating 
the global music industry. On the other hand, and from a philosophical point 
of view, they could bring a reloaded version of aesthetic empiricism to the 
fore again – that is, an account in which works of art are no more made rele-
vant by their histories of production but just aesthetically appealing objects, 
to be enjoyed without regard to any notion of their origins. Somewhat para-
doxically, then, the digital revolution might eventually restore the seven-
teenth-century conception of art as cabinet de curiosités or Wunderkammer, 
a model in which a succession of beautiful objects and mirabilia of all kinds 
might lay side by side to be appreciated independently of their identity, his-
tory and cultural meaning. 
There is no principled reason to oppose this, any more than we currently 
oppose sound editing or post-processing, but – and this will be my final ques-
tion here – even if our social values are rapidly changing and the ideals we 
received from the modern age (the cult of authenticity, originality, and ge-
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nius)  are being today continually called into question by the advance of tech-
nology, can we to the same extent believe that there will ever be a time in 
which the fact that a work is forged or plagiarized will actually be irrelevant? 
When this happens – if it happens – then, and only then, a story like Hatto’s 
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